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Abstract 
The paper asseses, under the logical point of view, if Eu and Usa sanctions may have 
had direct, relevant and measureable consequences on Russian economy. The conclusion is 
that, notwithstanding the start of Russian economy worsening coincided roughly with the 
inception of sanctions, these latter could not be the reason of such economic downturn. As a 
matter of fact, the nature of measures foreseen by the sanctions is such, that they could not 
produce any evident and relevant direct consequences on Russian economy.  
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Le sanzioni di Ue e Usa e il loro impatto sulla Russia: una 
valutazione logico-qualitativa  
 
 
Sommario 
Lo studio valuta, dal punto di vista logico, se le sanzioni di Ue e Usa possano aver avuto 
delle conseguenze dirette, rilevanti e misurabili sull’economia russa. La conclusione è che, 
nonostante l’inizio del peggioramento dell’economia russa abbia coinciso 
approssimativamente con l’introduzione delle sanzioni, queste ultime non potevano essere la 
ragione di tale crisi economica. Infatti, la natura delle misure previste dalle sanzioni è tale, 
che esse non potevano avere nessun evidente diretta conseguenza significativa 
sull’economia russa. 
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Introduction 
 
As it emerged from the author’s personal experience meeting Russian 
academic representatives, many of them do not have a clear perception of 
the content of Eu and Usa sanctions aimed at Russia, and above all, they 
think that the worsening of Russian economy of the recent years is due 
(more or less) exclusively to Eu and Usa sanctions.  
Nevertheless, the exact content of Eu and Usa sanctions are easily 
downloadable from internet, and precisely from European Union site, and 
from Us Department of State site.  
Regardless the lack of information on the nature of sanctions, the feeling 
that sanctions hit badly the Russian economy is shared by the mainstream 
literature. Even if, as it will be recalled in par. 5, there is not a common 
assessment of consequences of Eu and Usa sanctions, all researchers take it 
for granted that sanctions influenced somehow economic trends in Russia, 
and partly also the European ones.  
This paper is aimed at examining this topic from a different perspective, 
that is focussing the analysis on logical links between measures taken by 
Eu and Usa and Russian economic situation. Namely, if the effective 
content of sanctions might have influenced Russian economic phenomena 
(or not).  
Therefore, this study starts from the detailed description of the exact 
content of sanctions, as they are outlined by the competent authorities (Eu 
Delegation in Russia for European Union and Department of State for Usa). 
The second step is the analysis of the evolution of Russian economy in 
the last years, starting from 2013, that is from the year before the inception 
of Eu and Usa sanctions versus Russia, which were the response to the 
actions taken by the Russian government in Ukraine in 2014.  
The aim of this second step is to ascertain if, after the introduction of 
sanctions, the Russian economy changed its path.  
The third step, the most important one, is the assessment, guided by 
logical considerations, if, and to what extent, the main measures envisaged 
by the sanctions might have affected the economic indicators (i.e. Gdp 
growth rate, inflation rate) describing Russian economy. 
The fourth step is a short recall of some studies on consequences of Eu 
and Usa sanctions, so as to verify if there is a general agreed evaluation on 
the effects of measures taken by Eu and Usa on Russian economy. 
The results of these steps will be reported in the last paragraph 
(Conclusions).   
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It is necessary to highlight that: 
1. this paper does not take into account the consequences of restrictions 
on imports decided by Russian authorities, as response to Eu and Usa 
sanctions; 
2. the assessment carried out in this paper is based on a logical-
qualitative approach.  
 
 
1. The Eu Sanctions 
 
 
1.1 The Eu strategy on sanctions against Russia 
 
The Eu sanctions versus Russian Federation are clearly outlined in Eu 
delegation in Russia internet site 
(https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-
against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en). 
As it emerges from the web page, the sanctions were introduced for a 
serious reason, that is the illegal annexation of Crimea and deliberate 
destabilisation of a neighbouring sovereign country (Ukraine) in 2014. 
It is the case to recall that Eu did not recognise the annexation of Crimea 
by Russia. The reason is very simple: many countries have residents of 
different citizenship and coming from several countries, and it is 
unconceivable that a country can annex a part of another country for the 
reason that many dwellers of that area are their national citizen (of the 
annexing country, as it was the case of Russia).  
Eu links the duration of the sanctions to the complete implementation of 
the Minsk agreements, aimed at solving the Ukrainian crisis. At the 
moment of delivering this paper (June 28th 2017), they were foreseen till 
January 31st 2018. 
 
 
1.2 The content of Eu sanctions 
 
The sanctions implemented by Eu can be grouped in several categories: 
a) Diplomatic measures: 
- exclusion of Russia from G8 (which became G7) meetings; 
- suspension of negotiations over Russia’s joining the Oecd 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which gathers 
the most developed countries, based in Paris). 
b) Restrictive measures (asset freezes and visa bans) applied to: 
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- 150 persons (whose list is available at the internet address above 
quoted); 
- 37 entities, which are subject to a freeze of their assets in Eu.  
The persons and entities targeted by sanctions are considered 
responsible for actions against Ukraine's territorial integrity, or for 
providing support to, or benefitting Russian decision-makers, which 
confiscated or benefitted from a transfer of ownership of entities in Crimea 
and Sevastopol, contrary to Ukrainian law. 
c) Restrictions on economic exchanges with Crimea and Sevastopol:  
- a ban on imports of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol unless 
they have Ukrainian certificates; 
- a prohibition to invest in Crimea. Europeans and Eu-based companies 
can no longer buy real estate or entities in Crimea, finance Crimean 
companies, or supply related services. In addition, they may not invest in 
infrastructure projects in 6 sectors; 
- a ban on providing tourism services in Crimea or Sevastopol. 
European cruise ships may not call at ports in the Crimean peninsula, 
except in case of emergency. This applies to all ships owned or controlled 
by a European or flying the flag of an Eu Member State; 
- a ban for the export or for the use in Crimea of goods and technology 
for the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors, or the exploration 
of oil, gas and mineral resources; 
- a prohibition to provide technical assistance, brokering, construction or 
engineering services related to infrastructure in the same sectors as above. 
d) Financial measures:  
- Eu nationals and companies may no longer buy or sell new bonds, 
equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days, 
issued by: 
• 5 major state-owned Russian banks; 
• 3 major Russian energy companies; 
• 3 major Russian defence companies; 
• subsidiaries outside the Eu of the entities quoted above, and those 
acting on their behalf or at their direction; 
- assistance in relation to the issuing of such financial instruments is also 
prohibited; 
- Eu nationals and companies may also not provide loans with a 
maturity exceeding 30 days to the entities described above. 
e) Trade measures:  
- embargo on the import and export of arms and related material from/to 
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Russia, covering all items on the Eu common military list, with some 
exceptions; 
- prohibition on exports of dual use goods and technology for military 
use in Russia or to Russian military end-users, including all items in the Eu 
list of dual use goods; 
- prior authorisation by competent authorities of Member States of 
exports of certain energy-related equipment and technology to Russia. 
Export licenses will be denied if products are destined for oil exploration 
and production in waters deeper than 150 meters or in the offshore area 
north of the Arctic Circle, and projects that have the potential to produce oil 
from resources located in shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing. 
f) Limitations of service provision: the services necessary for the above 
mentioned projects may not be supplied, such as drilling, well testing, 
logging and completion services and supply of specialised floating vessels. 
g) Limitations to economic cooperation:  
- suspension of Eib (European Investiment Bank) and Ebrd (European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development) of new financing to Russian 
projects; 
- suspension of Eu-Russia bilateral and regional cooperation 
programmes, except for the cross-border cooperation and civil society. 
As it results from the above list, no Eu sanction is directed against 
Russian people or Russian companies, except the ones operating in Crimea, 
and few others operating in specific sectors (the ones quoted above).  
In other terms the sanctions are precisely targeted, and of limited extent, 
and therefore cannot hit in a relevant and measurable way the economy of a 
large country as Russia.  
 
 
2. The Usa Sanctions 
 
 
2.1 The Usa strategy on sanctions against Russia 
 
The Usa strategy on sanctions against Russia is clearly outlined in the 
Us Department of State web page 
(https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia). 
Sanctions are still operational at the moment of delivering this paper 
(June 28th 2017).  
In short, United States wanted to increase diplomatic and financial costs 
of Russia’s actions towards Ukraine.  
The sanctions hit a number of Russian and Ukrainian entities, including 
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14 defence companies and individuals in President Putin’s inner circle, as 
well as imposed targeted sanctions limiting certain financing to 6 of 
Russia’s largest banks and 4 energy companies.  
Usa also suspended credit finance that encourages exports to Russia and 
financing for economic development projects in Russia, and lately 
prohibited the provision, exportation, or reexportation of goods, services, or 
technology in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic 
offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in the 
Russian Federation. 
These actions, in close coordination with Eu and international partners, 
sent a strong message to the Russian government that there are 
consequences for their actions that threaten the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Ukraine.  
According to Usa authorities’ perspective, a secure Ukraine, integrated 
with Europe and enjoying good relations with all its neighbours, is in the 
interests of the United States, Europe, and Russia. 
 
 
2.2 The content of Usa sanctions 
 
The Usa sanctions are clearly described in the web page quoted at the 
beginning of this paragraph.  
They are contained in 4 executive orders issued by the previous Obama 
Administration of Usa:  
1) Executive Order 13660; 
2) Executive Order 13661; 
3) Executive Order 13662; 
4) Executive Order 13685. 
They are all downloadable from the web page.  
The first Executive Order, the 13660, signed on March 6th 2014, 
authorizes sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for violating the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, or for stealing the assets of 
the Ukrainian people. The sanctions consists in the block of assets in Usa 
and in restrictions on the travel to Usa of individuals and officials who took 
part, or contributed, to the destabilisation of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, 
misappropriation of state assets of Ukraine. 
The second Executive Order, the 13661, issued on March 17th 2014, on 
the account of deployment of Russian military forces in the Crimea region 
of Ukraine, foresees the blocking of property and travel restriction of 
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additional persons, that is officials of Russian Government, as well as 
persons or entities operating in the arms sector. 
The third Executive Order, the 13662, issued on March 20th 2014, 
expanded the scope of sanctions, consisting always in the freezing of assets 
and in travel restrictions to Usa, which now could include Russian 
companies operating in the following sectors: financial services, energy, 
metals and mining, engineering, and defence. It is up to the Secretary of the 
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to decide which 
entities could be subject to the sanctions.  
The last Executive Order, n. 13685, issued on December 19th 2014, 
foresees as sanctions the prohibition of: 
a) new investment in the Crimea region of Ukraine by a United States 
person; 
b) importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, 
services, or technology from the Crimea region of Ukraine; 
c) exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the 
United States, or by a United States person, of any goods, services, or 
technology to the Crimea region of Ukraine; 
d) any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United States 
person of any operation above quoted.  
As it emerged from the analysis of Eu sanctions, Usa sanctions too have 
a limited geographical and sectorial scope, which cannot change 
significantly (and measurably) a large economy as Russia. 
 
 
3. The evolution of Russian economy since 2013 
 
The economic situation of Russia is described in detail by Imf 
(International monetary fund) reports, and more precisely, the data quoted 
in this paragraph about Russian economy are taken from 2 Imf reports:  
1) World economic update, issued on January 16th 2017; 
2) Staff report for the 2016 article IV (Imf Country Report n. 16/229) 
about Russian Federation, issued on July 2016. 
The data on Russian economy from 2013 to 2017 are reported in table 1.  
Using as benchmark 2013, the last year before the introduction of 
sanctions, it is possible to state that in 2014 and 2015 (whose data are 
definitive) the economic situation worsened in Russia under every view 
point (Gdp, inflation, Government budget, exports, reserves). The estimates 
for 2016 see an improvement for the Gdp growth rate and for inflation 
indicators (but still a worsening of the remaining indicators), while for 
2017 is foreseen an improvement of all indicators.  
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This clarified, it is not said that limited measures, as the ones envisaged 
by Eu and Usa sanctions, could determine such a result.  
 
Table 1 -  Economic indicators relating to Russia 2013-2017 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 
(estimate) 
2017 
(forecast) 
Real Gdp growth rate 1.3 0.7 -3.7 -0.6* 1.1* 
Nominal Gdp (billions 
Us$) 
2,231 2,031 1,326 1,270 1,410 
Inflation rate 6.8 7.8 15.5 7.5 5.7 
Government budget (% 
Gdp) 
-1.2 -1.1 -3.5 -3.7 -1.6 
Exports (billions Us$) 523.3 497.8 339.6 299.0 332.2 
Imports (billions Us$) 341.3 308.0 194.0 180.1 185.9 
International reserves 
(billions Us$) 
509.6 385.5 368.4 373.1 387.8 
Source: Staff report for the 2016 article IV (Imf Country Report n. 16/229) about Russia 
Federation, issued on July 2016 
* Data from World economic update, issued on January 16th 2017 
 
As a matter of fact, it is well known that many factors may influence an 
economy, and considering that Russian productive sector depends largely 
on commodities markets, it becomes very difficult, under the logical point 
of view, to support the idea that the worsening of Russian economic system 
was due to limited measures, such as the ones foreseen by European and 
American authorities, in the framework of economic and diplomatic 
initiatives against Russia.   
 
 
4. Analysis of possible direct consequences of sanctions on 
economic trends 
 
In this paragraph it will be assessed the potential harm on an economic 
system (in our case Russia) caused by the measures foreseen by Eu and Usa 
sanctions. 
In order to facilitate this assessment, every measure foreseen by Eu and 
Usa sanctions is assigned to one of the following 5 homogenous groups of 
measures: 
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1) Travel Ban and Assets freeze2; 
2) Diplomatic measures; 
3) Block of export to/import from/investment in Crimea; 
4) Reduction of financing to some Russian banks and companies; 
5) Prohibition/reduction of Eu and Usa exports to some Russian companies 
(arms, energy, oil research, mining). 
The next step is the choice of the main economic indicators describing 
the economic situation of a country (Russia).  
It is reasonable, in order to set up a logical link between sanctions and 
economic situation, to choose the same indicators as the ones of table 1, 
that is: 
a) Gdp growth rate; 
b) Inflation rate; 
c) Government budget deficit; 
d) Exports (in Us$); 
e) Imports (in Us$); 
f) International reserves (in Us$). 
Putting on lines of a table the latter and on columns of the same table 
the groups of measures envisaged by sanctions, it turns out table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Potential logical effects of sanctions on (Russian) economy 
 Travel 
Ban and 
Assets 
freeze 
 
Diplomatic 
measures 
Block of export 
to/import 
from/investment in 
Crimea 
Reduction of 
financing to 
some Russian 
banks and 
companies 
Prohibition/ 
Reduction of 
Eu and Usa 
exports to some 
Russian 
companies  
Gdp  No No Very limited No Very limited 
Inflation  No No No No No 
Government 
budget  
No No No No No 
Exports  No No Very limited No Very limited 
Imports  No No Very limited No Very limited 
International 
reserves  
No No No No No 
Source: Author’s assessment 
 
Table 2 highlights the potential direct impact on each economic 
indicator of every specific group of measures foreseen by sanctions.  
 
2 Persons and entities involved in Crimea annexation and some Russian government 
officials. 
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It is the case to underline that this is the author’s assessment, and its 
nature is exclusively qualitative (and not quantitative).  
The latter could be measured obtaining from the targeted Russian 
companies or Russian areas (Crimea) hit by sanctions an exact estimate of 
the cost brought about by Eu and Usa sanctions.  
That said, and starting this analysis with the first group of sanctions 
(Travel Ban and Assets freeze), it is possible to state that these measures 
could not have any impact on any economic indicator, considered that it 
targeted few tens of persons and companies, whose weight on Russian 
economy is very likely much less than 0,1%. Considered that, probably, 
they did not lose all their economic activity, but only a part, it is clear that 
the effect of this first group of measures cannot have any influence on 
Russian economy. 
The same consideration can be made for diplomatic measures, which 
have no potential influence on economic indicators. 
On the contrary, the measures of the third group (Block of export 
to/import from/investment in Crimea) might influence 3 economic 
indicators (Gdp, Exports, Imports).  
Recognised that, it cannot be denied that Crimea is a region which 
became part of Russian Federation (and its annexation was the main reason 
for sanctions), and therefore its economic activity, even if weakened by 
sanctions, represented an added value for Russian economy, and therefore 
this third group of sanctions could not reduce Gdp, nor Export/Import, nor 
International reserves of Russia, but, on the contrary, it has likely increased 
them, even if very slightly.  
All in all, the third group of measures could not worsen the Russia’s 
economic system. 
The fourth group of sanctions (Reduction of financing to some Russian 
banks and companies) could not have any direct impact on any economic 
indicator. 
First of all, for the fact that just few enterprises had been hit by 
sanctions.  
Second, even if in a very limited way, the sanctions might harm only 
under the condition that those companies could not find elsewhere the 
financial resources they needed. But this is not the case of Russian financial 
market, for the simple reason that Russia had a stock of domestic credit 
valued 818 billions of Us$ at the end of 2016 (Cia world factbook), not to 
mention that Russian international reserves at the end of 2016 were 
estimated in 365 billion of Us$ (Cia world factbook, which placed Russia 
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at the 7th ranking in the world for this indicator).  
Therefore, it is not reasonable imagine that the few Russian companies 
targeted by sanctions could not find elsewhere the funds not provided by 
European and American financial institutions. 
The last group of sanctions (Prohibition/Reduction of Eu and Usa 
exports to some Russian companies) might theoretically have influenced 3 
economic indicators (Gdp, Exports, Imports).  
In this case too, it has to be acknowledged that the restrictions were 
focussed on specific sectors (arms, energy, oil research, mining), and 
applied only to a limited number of companies.  
A potential harm to these few companies might have taken place only 
under the condition that the reduced import of machinery and other 
industrial products could not be replaced by the same items, imported from 
countries not engaged in sanctions, or produced by domestic companies. 
Better, the damage might have emerged only under the condition that 
the Eu and Us companies exporting to Russia detained a sort of world 
monopoly on those products.  
To prove this condition (monopoly or impossibility to replace imported 
goods from Eu and Usa in those limited fields) is not easy, and in any case, 
not to be taken for granted.   
In conclusion, even if the content of table 2 is simply the result of a 
logical consideration of potential direct effects of measures foreseen by Eu 
and Usa sanctions, it is difficult to state that 3 out of 5 groups of measures 
(Travel bans and Assets freeze of a limited number of individuals and 
entities, Diplomatic measures, Reduction of financing of a limited number 
of Russian financial companies) might have had any direct impact on 
Russian economic situation.  
In the same way it is difficult to prove that the block on trade exchanges 
and investment from Eu and Usa in a very small area of the country 
(Crimea) compared to the rest of the country (Russian federation), as well 
as the prohibition or reduction of exports from Eu and Usa to some Russian 
companies operating in specific sectors (arms, energy, oil research, mining), 
might have had a direct impact on Inflation, Government budget, 
International reserves (owned by the Russian central bank).  
On the contrary, it is likely that, even if in a very limited extent, the 
measures above quoted (Third and Fifth group of measures) might have had 
actually a negative direct influence on Gdp, as well as on Exports and 
Imports volumes.  
But, as recalled at the beginning of the paragraph, a quantitative 
measurement of the direct influence of Eu and Usa sanctions on Russian 
economy’s indicators would require a precise enquiry carried out 
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examining targeted Russian companies, in order to quantify the damage 
they suffered, and therefore the influence of this damage on economic 
indicators. 
It is difficult to imagine to carry out such an enquiry, at least without the 
collaboration of those companies and the Russian authorities.  
 
 
5. Literature on the topic of effects of Eu and Usa sanctions on 
Russian economy 
 
Notwithstanding the apparently obvious considerations above outlined, 
many studies have tackled the topic of effects of Eu and Usa sanctions on 
Russian economy, with the purpose to quantify the damage caused by 
sanctions. 
Anyway the search3 carried out by the author of this paper showed that 
there is no general agreement on the estimated harm suffered by Russian 
economy, even if all researchers executed an analytical assessment of the 
consequences of all specific measures foreseen by sanctions, on all main 
indicators of Russian economy.  
Some researchers recognised that it is difficult to make an assessment of 
sanctions’ effect on Russian economy. For instance, Domańska and Kardaś 
(2016), in a commentary of the Centre for Eastern Studies4, admitted that, 
relating to the sanctions’ effects on Russian economy, “it is difficult to 
estimate their consequences precisely”. At the end of that paper the 
researchers concluded that “it will most likely only be possible to assess the 
full scale of this impact [of sanctions] in a few years’ time”.  
On the same wavelength is the Congressional research service of United 
States. Nelson (2017), a specialist in international trade and finance, 
working for this service of Us parliament, admitted that “it is difficult to 
assess whether, and to what extent, the targeted Us and Eu sanctions in 
response to the conflict in Ukraine, and Russia’s retaliatory measures, have 
 
3 It has to be acknowledged that, considering the purpose of the present paper, the search 
has not been conducted in depth, but was aimed at finding some studies, which showed 
different results, so as to confirm the assumption that there is not a shared view on the 
(negative) effects of Eu and Usa sanctions on Russian economy. 
4 OSW, an independent public research institution based in Warsaw. 
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impacted the Russian economy broadly over the past two to three years”. 
That said, this researcher recalled that “many economists, including at 
the Imf, have argued that the twin shocks of multilateral sanctions and low 
oil prices were the major driver behind Russia’s economic challenges in 
2014 and 2015”. 
Actually the International Monetary Fund Staff Report on Russian 
Federation (2015) estimated that Us and Eu sanctions, summed up to 
Russia’s retaliatory ban on agricultural imports, reduced output in Russia 
over the short term between 1.0% and 1.5%, while over the medium term 
there could be a more substantial reduction of output by up to 9%. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties, Gurvicha and Prilepskiya (2015), tried 
to make such an assessment, published in Russian Journal of Economics. 
After a very long and in depth exam of financial effects of sanctions, the 
authors declared, among several conclusions, that “According to our 
calculations, the total net capital inflow losses due to the sanctions from 
2014 through 2017 will amount to 8% of 2013 Gdp (with low oil prices), 
whereas the accumulated Gdp losses are estimated at 6 p.p. of 2013 Gdp”. 
A different estimate has been carried out by Kholodilin and Netšunajev 
(2016), using the structural VAR econometric model. According to these 
economists, who published their results in a discussion paper of the 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, “on average, 1.97% of the Gdp 
quarter-on-quarter growth is estimated to be lost due to sanctions by 
Russia”. Furthernmore, the two researchers declared that an indirect effect 
of the sanctions has been the adjustment of the real exchange rates, and 
presumably the depreciation of Russian Rouble. 
An example of a study examining the effects of sanctions on a specific 
sector of Russian economy is the one carried out by Gros and Mustilli 
(2016). In a commentary published by Ceps5, the authors examined the 
effects of sanctions on the side of Eu-Russia trade flows (and therefore on 
economic costs to Eu), highlighting that the share of Russian imports from 
Eu had remained stable (at around 50% of the overall goods imported) until 
the end of 2015, notwithstanding the introduction of sanctions.   
A similar study, but with a different conclusion, has been conducted by 
Crozet and Hinz for Cepii6 (2016). These researchers estimated in 60.2 
billion of Us$ (between 2014 and mid 2015) the reduction of exports to 
Russia from 37 countries, including Usa, Eu, Japan. Furthermore, they 
 
5 A European think tank based in Brussels. 
6 A French research center in international economics based in Paris. 
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declared that “the bulk of the impact stems from products that are not 
directly targeted by Russian retaliations (taking the form of an embargo on 
imports of agricultural products). This result suggests that most of the 
losses are not attributable to the Russian retaliation but to Western 
sanctions”. Therefore, these economists, even if they did not make an 
assessment, share the streamline opinion that Eu and Usa sanctions played 
an important role on Russian economy downturn. 
Summing up, there is not a general agreement on the size of effects of 
Eu and Usa sanctions on Russian economy.  
Not being the exam of the literature on this topic an objective of this 
work, in case the reader is interested, he/she may examine further studies.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
As it emerged from par. 1 and 2, measures foreseen by Eu and Usa 
sanctions could not have, under the logical point of view, a sensible (and 
measurable) direct impact on Russian economy, considering that they 
targeted few Russian companies for specific aspects (financing, sale of 
machinery and few other industrial products), as well as a very little area 
(Crimea), considered the size of the country (Russia).  
Therefore, the worsening of Russian economy since 2014 (the year of 
implementation of Eu and Usa sanctions against Russia), highlighted by par. 
4, is not logically linked to sanctions. 
That said, the search of factors unleashing the depression of Russian 
economy has to be directed elsewhere. 
It is not aim of this paper to investigate the causes of Russian economic 
downturn from 2014, which actually coincided with the introduction of 
sanctions.  
That reminded, it is reasonable to think that the worsening of Russian 
economy is due in part to the psychological profound impact of sanctions 
on Russian citizens and economic operators, whose behaviour probably 
changed after the introduction of Eu and Usa measures, starting from losing 
confidence on the prospect of Russian economy.  
A first signal of this change of expectations of Russian operators was 
the fall of the Russian national currency, the Rouble, whose loss of value at 
the end of 2014 was, necessarily, consequence of decisions of many 
Russians (mainly investors), who preferred to sell their national currency in 
order to buy Us dollars and Euros. This brought about the abrupt loss of 
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value of Rouble, whose exchange rate versus Euro and Us dollars 
plummeted to 50% of its previous value in few weeks. 
As a matter of fact, the value of a currency is the result of the balance of 
purchases and sales of that currency, and it stands to reason that, Eu and 
Usa, not possessing huge quantities of Roubles to sell (not being the 
Rouble a reserve currency), had no role in this event.  
A further reason of Russian economy downgrade is probably traceable 
in oil price fall, highlighting in this way the fragile structure of Russian 
economy, too depending on natural resources market prices.  
In conclusion, it is author’s opinion that there was not a direct influence 
of Eu and Usa sanctions on Russian economy, while it is possible that those 
sanctions had an indirect impact, depressing Russians, or better, their 
economic expectations.  
Anyway, the consequences of Eu and Usa sanctions have been for sure 
overestimated by Russians, a circumstance that probably did not spur the 
majority of Russian economists to look for real causes of Russian 
economy’s weaknesses, whose understanding represents the first step in a 
long path aimed at improving Russian economy, and consequently, Russian 
citizens’ well being.  
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